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Two experiments investigated whether 4- and 5-year-old children are sensitive to
whether the content of a generalization is about a salient or noteworthy property
(henceforth “striking”) and whether varying the number of exceptions has any effect on
children’s willingness to extend a property after having heard a generalization. Moreover,
they investigated how the content of a generalization interacts with exception tolerance.
Adult data were collected for comparison. We used generalizations to describe novel
kinds (e.g., “glippets”) that had either a neutral (e.g., “play with toys”) or a striking
property (e.g., “play with fire”) and measured how willing participants were to extend
the property to a new instance of the novel kind. Experiment 1 demonstrated that
both adults and children show sensitivity to strikingness in that striking properties
were extended less than neutral ones, although children extended less than adults
overall. The responses of both age groups were significantly different from chance.
Experiment 2 introduced varying numbers of exceptions to the generalization made
(minimal: 1 exception; maximal: 3 exceptions). Both adults and children extended
both types of properties even in the face of exceptions, but to a lower degree than
in Experiment 1. Striking properties were extended less than neutral ones, as in
Experiment 1. We observed that the greater the number of exceptions, the lower the
rates of extension we obtained, for both types of properties in adults, but only with
striking properties in children. Children seemed to keep track of varying numbers of
exceptions for striking properties, but their performance did not differ from chance. The
findings underscore that 4- and 5-year-old children are sensitive to strikingness and to
exception tolerance for generalizations and are developing toward an adult-like behavior
with respect to the interplay between strikingness and exception tolerance when they
learn about novel kinds. We discuss the implications of these results with regards to
how children make generalizations.
Keywords: generic language, generalization, inference, language acquisition, striking property
INTRODUCTION
Children acquiring language and knowledge about the world are faced with a challenge when they
encounter a specific object: which properties of that object are general properties of all objects of
the same kind, and which are unique to that object. For example, a child seeing a black cat that
has whiskers should generalize that cats have whiskers, but not draw the inference that cats are
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black. This is the case both for obvious properties of kinds,
(e.g., “cats have whiskers”), which can be acquired through
direct perceptual experience, but also for imperceptible ones
(e.g., “cats are curious”). Properties can furthermore be common
and familiar as in “cats have whiskers” or salient or noteworthy
(henceforth “striking”) like “sharks attack people.” Furthermore,
children have to pay attention to the possibility of exceptions to
a generalization they have formed. That is, the occurrence of a
whiskerless cat should not make them revise their generalization
that cats have whiskers. In two experiments, we investigated
whether 4- and 5-year-old children are sensitive to whether the
content of a generalization is about a striking property and to how
the content of a generalization interacts with exception tolerance.
Turning to the language used to convey information that
belongs to kinds of objects rather than to individual instances
thereof, in these investigations we use generic statements of the
type “cats have whiskers,” “birds fly” or “sharks attack people.”
Children show remarkable sensitivity to the distinction between
generic and non-generic (specific, quantificational) nominals
(Gelman et al., 2002, 2015; Gelman and Raman, 2003; Chambers
et al., 2008 among others).
For example, numerous studies by Gelman and colleagues
argue that preschoolers understand generics and are able to
distinguish them from non-generics on the basis of lexical,
morphosyntactic and contextual cues (see Gelman, 2003, 2010
for an overview and Lazaridou-Chatzigoga et al., 2015 for a
critical review). Children seem to interpret bare plural generics
as different from both statements with “some” and statements
with “all.” For instance, in Gelman et al.’s (2002) study, children
treated generics as intermediate between “all” and “some.”
Children seem to rely on generics when they learn about familiar
and novel kinds and they use them in order to draw inferences
(Hollander et al., 2002; Gelman and Bloom, 2007). Children seem
to know that a property introduced with a generic is likely to be
extended to new instances of the kind, both when they learn novel
properties of familiar categories (Gelman et al., 2002; Chambers
et al., 2008 with 4-year-olds) and when they learn properties of
novel kinds (Graham et al., 2011 with 30-month-old children).
However, the above evidence that children comprehend
certain aspects of the meaning of generics by age 4 does not
mean that children know how to integrate different types of
properties (neutral vs. striking) in their conceptualization of
kinds when they form generalizations. Additional features that
need to be learned include: (a) the fact that generalizations are
not only about characteristic properties, such as having whiskers
or nursing young, but can also be about striking properties
that are sufficiently noteworthy to allow generalization, even
in the absence of strong statistical prevalence (i.e., “sharks
attack people” is a felicitous generalization even though very
few of the world’s population of sharks do so) and (b) the fact
that generalizations allow for varying numbers of exceptions
(“cats have whiskers” allows for a few accidental exceptions of
whiskerless cats, “cats nurse their kittens” allows for a wide range
of systematic exceptions, namely, immature cats and male cats,
and “sharks attack people” allows for the vast majority of sharks
to be exceptions). These two features might be challenging for
children, as they force them to be attentive not only to the
language used to generalize (generic or not), but also to the
property that is predicated of the kind as well as to the possibility
of the generality not holding for all instances of a kind, but only
for most or some instances thereof.
There is some indicative evidence that children understand
that generalizations tolerate exceptions (see discussion in the
next section), but whether children know how to integrate
information about varying numbers of exceptions and how
children use that information while learning about novel kinds
has not been investigated before. Furthermore, the majority of
the studies thus far have focused on neutral properties without
looking at properties that are noteworthy, distinctive or striking
in some way. The present studies focus on how children draw
generalizations and on how type of property and the varying
number of exceptions interact. Before describing our studies, we
provide a short overview of the relevance of type of property and
exception tolerance for generalizations.
TWO CHARACTERISTICS OF
GENERALIZATIONS: TYPE OF
PROPERTY AND EXCEPTIONS
Type of Property
Prototypical generalizations such as “cats meow” and “tigers have
stripes” communicate strong generalizations and are about a
highly prevalent property of a kind.
Carlson (1977, p. 40) was the first to notice that examples like
“mosquitoes carry the paramecium that causes yellow fever” are
true of only a minority of the individuals under consideration,
but the sentence seems felicitous nevertheless. These so-called
“troublesome” generic generalizations have recently attracted the
attention of psychologists (Leslie, 2007, 2008) and have been
called “striking” generalizations (Leslie et al., 2011; Prasada et al.,
2013). They are characterized as cases where the “property must
only be had by a small minority of the kind, and must signify
something dangerous and to be avoided” (Prasada et al., 2013,
p. 409; Leslie, 2007, 2008, 2017). Prasada (2010) argues that
striking generalizations involve causal connections between the
kind and the property, in the sense that there is something about
the nature of the individuals that form the kind that causes them
to be disposed to have the property in question, irrespectively of
whether they actually possess it or not. To illustrate, “mosquitoes
carry the West Nile virus” does not mean that the majority of
mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus, but that there is something
in their common biological structure that causes them to have
the disposition to carry the disease. For more discussion, see also
Sterken (2015), where other proposals about how to deal with
these generalizations are discussed.
Leslie et al. (2011) compare striking generalizations to
a number of other types of generalization such as “quasi-
definitional” as in “triangles have three sides” (which are
exceptionless), “majority characteristic” as in “dogs have four
legs” (which are true of the overwhelming majority of instances,
with only a few exceptional individuals), “minority characteristic”
as in “ducks lay eggs” (which involve primary or secondary
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sexual characteristics of animals, and are thus only true of no
more than 50% of individuals) and “false generalizations” as in
“books are paperbacks” (which may be true of 80% or more of
individuals, and yet are not typically judged as true, and thus fail
as generic statements).
An interesting question arises with respect to striking
generalizations irrespective of the theoretical account we adopt
to analyze them: Are striking generalizations accepted despite
having low prevalence estimates? In the few relevant studies
(Leslie et al., 2011; Prasada et al., 2013) adult participants
accepted striking generalizations of the type “sharks attack
people” at rates between 70 and 77%. These rates were lower
than acceptance rates of quasi-definitional statements like “ants
are insects” (90%) and majority characteristic statements like
“tigers have stripes” (96%) and somewhat lower but still similar
to minority characteristic statements like “ducks lay eggs” (85 to
92%). They differed more clearly from acceptance rates for false
generalizations like “books are paperbacks” (38%), which were
mostly rejected.
Leslie (2008) argues that people are biased to attend to
properties that are striking or pose a threat to them, even when
their prevalence in the kind in question is not high. Cimpian
et al. (2010) reasoned that, based on Leslie (2008), this bias may
manifest as a tendency to accept generalizations about striking
properties more than about similar properties that do not have
these connotations. In a truth conditions task, the participants
were first given information about a property of a new kind
at different prevalence levels (10, 30, 50, 70, and 90%) in one
of three forms: (a) plain (“xx% of morseths have silver fur”),
(b) dangerous/distinctive (“xx% of morseths have dangerous
silver fur. This fur sheds particles that get logged in your lungs
and make it impossible to breathe. No other animals on this
island have this kind of fur”) or (c) non-distinctive control (“xx%
of morseths have curly silver fur. This fur is very curly and rough
to touch. Other animals on this island also have this kind of
fur”). The participants were then asked whether the following
sentence was true or false in either the generic (“morseths have
silver fur/dangerous silver fur/curly silver fur”) or the most-
form (“most morseths have silver fur”/dangerous silver fur/curly
silver fur”). In an implied prevalence task, the participants first
read a sentence in either the generic (“morseths have silver
fur/dangerous silver fur/curly silver fur”) or the most-form
(“most morseths have silver fur”/dangerous silver fur/curly silver
fur”) and they then were asked about the percentage of morseths
that has the property in question. The average prevalence that
led participants to accept generic statements (M = 69.1%) was
significantly lower than the average prevalence implied by them
(M = 95.8%). No such difference was found in the “most”
condition. With respect to item type, acceptance in the generic
condition was significantly higher for the dangerous/distinctive
items (68%) than for the neutral items (55%) or the non-
distinctive control items (48%). The effect was particularly strong
at the lower percentage levels (10 and 30% prevalence levels).
In the most-condition, participants were not sensitive to this
information and gave similar responses to all items (47% for the
dangerous/distinctive, 46% for the neutral and 45% for the non-
distinctive controls items). Cimpian et al. (2010) conclude that
the danger/distinctiveness information had an effect on generics’
acceptability, seen especially at the lower prevalence levels, while
it had no effect on items that lacked this feature.
On the interplay between strikingness and exception
tolerance, Leslie (2008, p.15) argues that “the criteria that
govern troublesome generics reflect our psychology . . . the
more striking, appalling, or otherwise gripping we find the
property predicated in the generic, the more tolerant the generic
is to exceptions”.
The only attempt to go beyond familiar and high-frequency
properties (e.g., sleeps, drinks milk) in studies of the acquisition
of generalizations is Graham et al. (2016), who investigated 30-
month-olds’ willingness to extend atypical properties to members
of an unfamiliar category by asking them to imitate an act. The
properties were introduced in one of the following three ways:
(a) with a generic noun phrase (“Blicks drink ketchup”), (b) with
a non-generic noun phrase (“These blicks drink ketchup”) or
(c) with an attentional phrase (“Look at this”). Willingness to
extend was boosted by the presence of a generic noun phrase
compared to the other two conditions. This shows that atypical
properties are also consistently extended when they are presented
with a generic nominal. However, this study did not combine
typical and atypical properties within the same design, so the
difference that property type can make on extension rates
was not measured.
There is little, therefore, if any at all, research on what children
know about generalizations with striking properties, whether
they treat them differently from other types of generalizations,
whether varying the number of exceptions prevents them from
generalizing and how exception tolerance interacts with the
content of a generalization. In our studies we wanted to address
the developmental course of different types of generalizations and
to establish whether certain generalizations are learned earlier
than others. Instead of measuring acceptance rates for striking
generalizations directly, we decided to adopt a design that would
measure how likely people (both children and adults) are to
extend striking information as opposed to neutral information
to more instances of the same kind. This design was adopted
because it was deemed to be more child-friendly than a truth-
value judgment task and because we could rely on pre-existing
literature that had developed a task that fit our purposes
(Chambers et al., 2008).
Exceptions
The most distinctive characteristic of generic statements
is arguably the fact that they tolerate exceptions (Krifka
et al., 1995). The generic generalization “birds fly” can be
truthfully uttered even in the face of exceptions, such as
flightless birds like penguins or ostriches, whereas the universal
generalizations “all birds fly” or “every bird flies” are false
given the existence of exceptions such as the above. The
percentage of exceptions allowed seems to depend on the
type of generic generalization in question ranging from 0%,
as in (1), to a few abnormal cases, as in (2), to around
50%, as in (3), and even reaching 99%, as in (4). That is,
exception tolerance seems to be a matter of degree and to
further depend on the domain in question and the properties
predicated of the kind (see discussion in Pelletier, 2010;
Leslie et al., 2011).
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(1) Ants are insects.
(2) Tigers have stripes.
(3) Ducks lay eggs.
(4) Sharks attack people.
This complex picture is also seen in different acceptance rates
for different types of generic generalizations in experimental
studies with adults. Leslie et al. (2011, Experiment 1) found that
acceptance rates for bare plural generic statements in a forced
choice judgment task varied as follows: “quasi-definitional” like
(1) were accepted at 90%, “majority characteristic” like (2) at 96%,
“minority characteristic” like (3) at 85% and “striking” like (4) at
77%. This experiment though did not explicitly manipulate the
exceptions, so we can only infer from the different acceptance
rates that they might be due to different degrees of exception
tolerance. Tolerance of exceptions was investigated by Lazaridou-
Chatzigoga et al. (2019) in an experiment where participants
judged the felicity of bare plural generic statements after a
short context was provided. There, acceptance rates of majority
characteristic generics (e.g., “tigers have stripes,” “horses have
four legs”) were lower (87%) when preceded by a context that
made accidental exceptions (e.g., albino tigers or three-legged
horses) salient, than when a preceding context did not mention
any exceptions (99%). By comparison, the acceptance rates for
universally quantified statements (e.g., “all tigers have stripes,”
“all horses have four legs”) dropped from 81% in the neutral
context to only 48% in the context with salient exceptions. The
high acceptance rate for generic statements even immediately
following a context making exceptions salient confirms that
adults are highly tolerant of exceptions to generic statements.
There is some indicative evidence that children know that
generics tolerate exceptions (Hollander et al., 2002; Gelman and
Raman, 2003; Gelman and Bloom, 2007; Chambers et al., 2008).
In research involving familiar kinds and properties, Hollander
et al. (2002) found that 4-year-olds (but not 3-year-olds) behaved
like adults in that they answered “yes” to generic questions
referring to “narrow-scope” properties like “do girls have curly
hair?” more often than “all” questions (“do all girls have curly
hair?”) but significantly less often than to “some” questions (“do
some girls have curly hair?”). Thus, Hollander et al. (2002)
concluded that by 4 years of age children treated generics
as different from both “some” and “all,” showing that they
understand that they allow for the possibility of counterexamples.
Gelman and Raman (2003) found that children seem to know
that familiar kinds like birds and dogs can have exceptions, such
as penguins and three-legged dogs. Their 4-year-old participants
performed similarly to adults and answered “yes” to a question
like “Here are two birds. Now I am going to ask you a
question about birds. Can birds fly?” when they were shown
two exceptional birds (in this case, two penguins), while they
answered mainly “no” when the question was phrased with a
definite (“Can the birds fly?”).
Other research investigates children’s reasoning about novel
kinds. When learning about observable properties of novel
kinds, Gelman and Bloom (2007) argue that 4- and 5-year-olds
recognized that generics can be true despite salient exceptions.
They exposed children and adults to scenarios involving novel
animals, such as “dobles”, that do or do not have claws. Their
results show that under certain contexts both children and
adults accepted generic statements such as “dobles have claws”
even when not all the specific instances available exhibited the
relevant property, i.e., some were claw-less, while they rejected
statements with possessives (“my dobles” for the adults) and
demonstratives (“these dobles” for the children) in the same
situations. Chambers et al. (2008) went one step further and
studied abstract properties of novel kinds. In their Experiment 2,
after having been introduced to novel kinds (“These are pagons.
Pagons are friendly.”), children extended the relevant property
to a new instance of the same kind even in the face of a
counterexample (i.e., an unfriendly pagon). Extension rates were
at 65% with generic bare plurals (“pagons”) but at 27% with a
demonstrative (“these pagons”). Only the extension rates after
generics were significantly higher than chance.
Overall, the picture that emerges is that by the age of 4
children know that generic generalizations allow for exceptions
both with familiar and novel kinds. As discussed above,
exception tolerance seems to be a matter of degree and to
further depend on the domain in question and the properties
predicated of the kind. There is little, if any, research on
whether varying the number of presented exceptions for a
given generalization would influence how children learn on
the basis of generics. The degree of exception tolerance of a
given generalization is especially interesting in cases where there
seem to be more counterexamples to the rule than positive
instances. For instance, for a statement like “sharks attack
people,” exceptional sharks that do not attack people are the
vast majority of the kind, but people would still accept the
statement as true based on the belief/knowledge that a tiny
percentage of sharks do so.1 Finally, we wanted to investigate
how exception tolerance and the type of property interact when
children form generalizations.
THE PRESENT STUDIES
Two experiments were conducted to systematically answer the
following three questions: (a) are children sensitive to the
content of generalizations in so far as it is not a characteristic
but a striking property in the relevant sense? That is, do
children extend properties (form generalizations) at the same
rate for striking and neutral properties? (b) does varying the
number of exceptions have any effect on children’s willingness
to extend a property after having heard a generalization? That
is, does varying the number of exceptions (presenting many
or fewer exceptions) prevent children from generalizing? and
(c) if participants are sensitive to the number of exceptions
they are presented with when forming a generalization, does
the type of property (neutral or striking) make a difference in
how the varying number of exceptions affects generalizations?
This is a question about the interaction, therefore, of type of
1To put things into real world perspective, according to the Florida Museum of
Natural History’s Department of Ichthyology there is a worldwide average of 50–
70 shark attacks every year. Humans, in contrast, annually kill approximately 100
million sharks (Worm et al., 2013).
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property and exception tolerance. In designing the experiments,
we relied on Chambers et al. (2008), where novel creatures
were introduced to the children, about which they had
no prior knowledge. In Experiment 1, we operationalized
strikingness for children. We asked whether children would
show sensitivity to strikingness for generalizations, given that
we know that generics are commonly used to convey striking
information about kinds. Instead of using examples such as
“sharks attack people,” we opted for child-friendly alternatives.
In Experiment 2, we asked whether varying the number of
exceptions presented would play any role in the participants’
willingness to extend a neutral/striking property to a new
instance. Thus, we asked how exception tolerance and the content
of generalizations interact.
Based on previous literature showing that 4-year-old
understand that generalizations allow for exceptions and that
they consistently extend properties to new instances of a
novel kind when these are introduced with a generic nominal
(Chambers et al., 2008), we predicted that 4- and 5-year-old
would show willingness to extend the property. Specifically,
we predicted that children would extend the property of a
newly presented kind introduced with a generic sentence to a
new instance of the kind. We also predicted that adults would
behave similarly.
Regarding children’s sensitivity to strikingness, we wanted
to investigate whether children know that generalizations can
be about different types of properties, ranging from neutral to
striking properties. If this sensitivity is established, there is a
further issue. If children were aware of the breadth of the claims
one can make with a generic, they would be expected to extend
both neutral (common, familiar) and striking (uncommon, less
typical) properties. The sensitivity to the type of property could
take two different directions: (a) it could be that the fact that
the property is striking and less common leads participants to
be conservative and extend striking properties less than neutral
properties, or (b) it could be that both children and adults would
extend the property even more in the case of striking properties
than with neutral ones in order to maximize transfer of important
information about a novel kind. This second direction is linked
to Leslie’s theoretical account (2008) and Cimpian et al. (2010)’s
empirical findings that showed a stronger willingness to accept a
generic when it concerns a dangerous or distinctive property as
opposed to a neutral property. On the other hand, support for
the first direction comes from the Prasada et al. (2013) finding
that adults judged striking generics to be true less often than even
“minority characteristic” generics like “ducks lay eggs” in out of
the blue contexts where no exceptions are made salient to either
type of generalization.
Regarding children’s sensitivity to the degree of exception
tolerance as modulated by the type of property in generalizations,
our expectations were that it should matter if the property is
neutral or striking and, furthermore, whether we have minimal
or maximal exceptions. When only one exception was presented
(minimal condition), we were expecting lower extension rates
than when no exceptions were present, but potentially similarly
high extension rates both for neutral and striking properties.
When more exceptions were presented (maximal condition), we
were expecting lower extension rates than when less exceptions
were present (minimal condition). Furthermore, following
Leslie (2008) and Cimpian et al. (2010) we were expecting a
difference between neutral and striking properties in the maximal
condition: the decrease of extension (between minimal and
maximal condition) for striking properties should be smaller
than the decrease of extension (between minimal and maximal
condition) for neutral properties because striking properties are
licensed in rare noteworthy cases. That is, the effect of maximal
exceptions in the case of striking properties should be weaker
given that it is crucially when the property is striking as in the case
of “sharks attack people” that we expect that despite the many
exceptions, extending the property is still justified. We expected
similar behavior with adults.
To summarize, we had the following four predictions (in
parentheses we mention the experiment that tests each of them):
Prediction 1 (Experiment 1) “sensitivity to strikingness”:
participants are expected to show sensitivity to strikingness by
extending striking properties at a different rate – either more
or less – than neutral ones
Prediction 2 (Experiment 1–Experiment 2): “sensitivity to
exceptions”: in the face of exceptions, extensions will be
lower than when no exceptions are present for both kinds
of properties
Prediction 3 (Experiment 2): “sensitivity to number of
exceptions”: the greater the number of the exceptions, the
lower the extension rates, for both kinds of properties
Prediction 4 (Experiment 2): “tolerance of maximal
exceptions”: following Leslie (2008) and Cimpian et al.
(2010), in the case of maximal exceptions, the decrease
in extension rate for minimal exceptions to striking
properties will be smaller than the decrease in extension
rate for minimal exceptions to neutral properties, that is,
striking generalizations would show a greater tolerance of
maximal exceptions
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we operationalized strikingness for children.
Chambers et al. (2008) chose imperceptible properties that
were either trait terms (friendly, shy, gentle, mean) or physical
characteristics (strong, fast), which were familiar and common.
They did not control for noteworthiness or strikingness as they
had different purposes in that study. We constructed items with
precisely these dimensions of meaning in mind in order to
ask whether children would show sensitivity to strikingness for
generics. Instead of using examples such as “sharks attack people,”
we opted for child-friendly alternatives. We also collected adult
data for comparison. We describe the items in more details in
the section below.
Both studies were carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of the Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics
Committee with written informed consent from all subjects.
Adult subjects gave written informed consent and parents gave
written informed consent for their children to participate in
the studies in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The
study was approved by the Cambridge Psychology Research
Ethics Committee.
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Method
Participants
A total of 32 English-speaking children (18 male; 14 female)
between 51 and 69 months of age (M = 60.53, SD = 5.1)
were recruited from a local primary school in London,
United Kingdom. All children were English native speakers and
residents in London, United Kingdom. The sample included both
monolingual and bilingual children. For bilinguals, their parents
and teachers assessed that English was their dominant language.
A total of 140 English-speaking adults (69 male, 71 female)
between 18 and 66 years of age (M = 35.35, SD = 11.95) were
recruited via Prolific Academic, an on-line recruitment platform
for research.2 They were all English native speakers and residents
in the United Kingdom.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two
conditions: neutral (16 children; 70 adults) and striking
(16 children; 70 adults).
Design
The design was based on Chambers et al. (2008) Experiment 2.
Eight kinds of novel creatures were created using modeling clay
and six instances were created for each kind (only three of which
were used in Experiment 1). The individual instances differed
only in color, and the experimenter pseudorandomised the color
combinations between trials in a way that prevented participants
making generalizations on the basis of color similarity. Each
creature was given one of eight novel names (ackle, borp, glippet,
murb, pagon, scobbit, vardie, zorb)3 and was paired with one
property which was either “neutral” or “striking” in the relevant
sense. The creatures can be seen in Figure 1 below.
For the properties, we decided to use imperceptible, non-
obvious properties that could not be assessed on the basis of
the visual features of our experimental creatures. Instead of
using adjectives as Chambers et al. (2008) did, we used verbal
predicates and embedded them under the dispositional verb
“love” for maximum arousal and in order to make them more
child-friendly. In order to identify possible properties, we used
affective ratings from Warriner et al. (2013), who measured
valence, arousal, and dominance for 13,915 English lemmas by
collecting adult ratings on a 9-point scale. The three dimensions
were valence (the pleasantness of the stimulus), arousal (the
intensity of emotion provoked by the stimulus) and dominance
(the degree of control exerted by the stimulus). Examples of the
database at the extreme ends include the following: pedophile
(lowest valence: 1.26), vacation (highest valence: 8.53), grain
2For both experiments, the sample size for adults was at least three times larger
than the sample size for children. This decision was based on research that
compares Internet-based data to lab-based data, which has shown that the data
quality is similar as long as the Internet-based sample size is at least three times
larger than the lab-based sample size (see Gosling et al., 2004).
3For the creatures’ names, we created a list of names used in previous studies
(Chambers et al., 2008; Cimpian et al., 2010; Gelman et al., 2015) and normed them
with English native adult volunteers from the United Kingdom to check which
ones sounded more natural in both the singular and the plural form and more
different from existing words. From the higher ranked ones, we chose eight, some
mono- and some disyllabic, and we made sure they started with different sounds
and included a range of vowel and consonant sounds.
FIGURE 1 | Examples of eight novel kinds used in the experiments: ackle,
borp, glippet, murb, pagon, scobbit, vardie, zorb.
TABLE 1 | Items used in Experiments 1 and 2.
Neutral properties Striking properties
Ackles love to play with toys Ackles love to play with fire
Borps love to talk to their mothers Borps love to scare their mothers
Glippets love to run through parks Glippets love to smash through walls
Murbs love to draw their names Murbs love to shout their names
Pagons love to feel safe Pagons love to feel afraid
Scobbits love to make new games Scobbits love to cheat at games
Vardies love to play with cats Vardies love to play with snakes
Zorbs love to make people sing Zorbs love to make people angry
(lowest arousal: 1.6), insanity (highest arousal: 7.79), dementia
(lowest dominance: 1.68) and paradise (highest dominance: 7.9).
We identified words with high arousal and average valence,
which we used as a child-friendly proxy for “striking” and words
with average arousal and high valence, which we used as proxy
for “neutral.” We then cross-checked these against the Kuperman
et al. (2012) database for AoA (Age of Acquisition) of 30,000
English words in order to select only words that our young
participants would know. From this set of items, 8 pairs of
predicates that differed minimally in their syntactic structure
were created. In the final set of items used (see Table 1) striking
properties had high arousal (range 4.91–7.24, mean 6.08) and
average valence (range 2.53–4.68, mean 3.68), while neutral
properties had average arousal (range 3.14–5.24, mean 3.99) and
high valence (range 6.09–7.5, mean 6.85).4
Norming study
We performed a norming study online (38 adult English speakers
recruited from Prolific Academic took part via Qualtrics) in
order to control for baseline preferences for the experimental
properties. Participants were introduced to the creatures used
in the study in order to create a similar mind-frame to the
one used in the experiment and were then asked to judge
how likely a given property is, e.g., “how likely are ackles
to love to play with toys,” “how likely are ackles to love
to play with fire” etc. “Neutral” properties were judged to
be more likely on average (M = 64.15, SD = 12.43) than
4Our initial aim had been to use words with average arousal and average valence
for “neutral” properties. This was not possible though due to the restricted set of
properties that were both known to our young participants according to the AOA
database and would help us keep the syntactic structure of our items as close as
possible between neutral and striking properties. The choice was therefore made
to include items with high valence, which contrast clearly with the striking items.
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“striking” properties (M = 32.13, SD = 11.84). We found a
significant difference between “neutral” and “striking” properties,
as expected (t = 5.2766, df = 13.967, p< 0.001).
Procedure and materials
Children were tested individually in a quiet room in their school.
They were told that they would play a game with a puppet, called
Sarah. Sarah, whose voice was recorded by a female English native
speaker from the United Kingdom, presented the stimuli and
asked questions. During the pretest, familiar objects were used in
order to make sure that each child could accurately understand
and respond to questions about members of a category (e.g.,
judging whether different objects that were presented one after
the other could be called a “pig” – the objects used were a penguin,
a pig and a monkey). After each question in the pretest, feedback
was given to the child to make sure that they understood how
to model their replies (by answering either “yes” or “no”) to the
question asked. No feedback was given during the main task. On
each trial of the main task, the following procedure was followed,
after which the child’s response to the question was recorded and
the next trial began. The mean duration of the whole procedure
for children was 8 min 43 s (range: 7 min 35 s–11 min 30 s). Each
trial included the following two steps:
Step 1: Two instances of a novel creature were introduced
by Sarah (pre-recorded voice) and a property was attributed
using a generic nominal: “These are ackles. Ackles love to play
with toys (neutral)/fire (striking).”
Step 2: A third instance of the same kind was presented
along with a question that measured extension of
the property: “Does this ackle love to play with toys
(neutral)/fire (striking)?”
Adults completed an equivalent task embedded in a webpage
(Qualtrics). The adult version used the same script with a story
about a researcher substituting for the puppet in the live action
version, and with pictures of the novel kinds. Instead of listening
to a pre-recorded voice, the adults read the sentences attributed
to the researcher speaking. The task was the same, that is,
participants answered the question that measured extension of
the property to a new instance of the same kind by pressing the
corresponding key for “yes” or “no.” The mean duration of the
whole procedure for adults was 6 min and 11 s (range: 3 min
22 s–25 min 18 s).
Results and Discussion
Children extended both types of properties, with the neutral
properties giving rise to more extensions (89%) than the striking
ones (63%), while adults’ mean extension rates for neutral
TABLE 2 | Mean percentage of property extension across conditions in
Experiment 1.
Adult Child
Experiment 1 Neutral 96.43% (SE 0.78) 89.06% (SE 2.76)
Striking 90.18% (SE 1.26) 63.28% (SE 4.28)
Standard error in parenthesis.
properties were at 96% and for striking properties at 90% (see
Table 2 and Figure 2 below).
We used R (R Core Team, 2016) and the lme4 package (Bates
et al., 2015) to perform a generalized linear mixed-effects analysis,
specifying a binomial family. First, we fitted a model including all
of the relevant variables, that is, property.type and age (a binary
factor, child vs. adult) as fixed effects (with an interaction term)
and subject and item.no as random effects. Then, we performed
likelihood ratio tests. If the variable was part of an interaction, we
first tested the model with the interaction against a model with
just the main effects. The comparison proved non-significant
(χ2(1) = 1.5705, p = 0.21). Thus, adding an interaction term did
not significantly improve model fit, so we used the model without
the interaction term for all subsequent analyses. The full model
parameters (without the interaction) are provided in Table 3.
We then tested the main effects by fitting versions of the
full model, from which a single effect was removed, and then
compared the reduced model to the full model. In order to
test the main effect of property, we removed property.type.
We performed a likelihood ratio test of the full model against
the model without property.type and the comparison proved
significant (χ2(1) = 4.7778, p = 0.029). Thus, we concluded that
there was a main effect of property in that striking properties
were extended less than neutral properties. In order to test
the main effect of age, we removed age. We performed a
likelihood ratio test of the full model against the model without
age and the comparison proved significant (χ2(1) = 4.264,
p = 0.039). Thus, we concluded that there was a main effect
of age in that children were less likely to extend than adults in
both conditions.
Additional analyses were performed in order to determine
whether the percentage of property extensions was significantly
greater than chance. In order to do so, we fitted a glmer model
with only an intercept, no fixed predictors and subject as a
random effect. The intercept is the overall average property
extension rate and given that there were only two choices
(“yes”/“no”), zero corresponds to 50% extension (chance levels
are at 50%), so we can see if the intercept is significantly different
from that. The intercept was significantly different (β = 7.52,
SE = 0.84, z = 9, p < 0.001) from chance, thus we conclude that
the performance overall was significantly different from chance.
Then, we fitted a glmer model without an intercept in order to
look into individual conditions: the responses to both neutral
and striking properties were significantly different from chance
(neutral: β = 7.82, SE = 0.99, z = 7.87, p< 0.001; striking: β = 6.32,
SE = 1.1, z = 5.75, p < 0.001). Finally, we fitted a glmer model
without an intercept in order to look into the different age groups;
the responses of both adults and children were significantly
different from chance (adult: β = 7.39, SE = 0.94, z = 7.85,
p< 0.001; child: β = 5.58, SE = 1.54, z = 3.63, p< 0.001).
The final analysis performed involved comparing the results
of Experiment 1 to the norming study. Focusing only on
the adults, we observe that acceptance for both conditions
significantly increased in Experiment 1 (neutral: 96%; striking:
90%) compared to the baseline measures of the norming study
(neutral: 64%; striking: 32%) (t = 8.6808, df = 16.598, p < 0.001).
We attribute this increase to the use of generic linguistic forms in
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FIGURE 2 | Mean percentage of property extension across conditions in Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard error.
Experiment 1 as opposed to asking general questions about the
properties in the norming study.
Discussion
This study serves as the first experiment that operationalizes
strikingness in the acquisition of properties of novel kinds via
generic generalizations. First, given that we obtained a main effect
of property, we conclude that both adults and children show
sensitivity to strikingness. This confirms that the content of a
generalization is important when learning about novel kinds and
when drawing inferences based on the type of property used. The
direction of the effect shows that both groups extended striking
properties less than neutral ones. It is also worth highlighting
that even the reduced acceptance rate for striking properties was
above chance for both children and adults. That is, children are
not only willing to extend a property to a new kind when it is a
TABLE 3 | Estimates, standard errors, z values and p values of the full glmm
in Experiment 1.
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(< |z|)
Intercept (adult, neutral) 6.5829 0.9515 6.919 4.56e-12∗∗∗
Age (child) –2.2553 1.0084 –2.237 0.0253∗
Property (striking) –1.8216 0.7791 –2.338 0.0194∗
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ 0.001, ∗∗ 0.01, ∗ 0.05.
neutral one like “playing with toys,” but also when it is a striking
one like “playing with fire.” That means that strikingness does not
prevent adults or 4- and 5-year-old children from being willing to
extend properties that they learned via generic generalizations.
The finding that both adults and children extended striking
properties less than neutral ones hasn’t been documented before
in the literature and calls for an explanation which we attempt in
section “General Discussion.” The fact that we observe the same
effect for both children and adults suggests that whatever it is that
makes striking generalizations different from neutral generics is
already relevant to 4- and 5-year-old children.
Second, given that we obtained a main effect of age, we
conclude that the children have not yet reached fully adult-
like willingness to license a generic inference given the type
of property. Mean extension rates across conditions for adults
are very high (for both conditions more than 90%) and higher
than the children’s mean extension rates. That is, we observe a
developmental effect in the way children treated neutral/striking
properties of novel kinds, and specifically that they were more
conservative than adults when it came to extending the property
to new instances of the novel kind. However, based on the
analyses on the difference from chance level, we conclude
that both adults and children performed in the task in a
statistically meaningful way.
In Experiment 2 we build on these results and seek an
explanation for the reduced extension rates of striking properties
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compared to neutral properties while we address the issue of
whether children’s and adults’ sensitivity to the type of property
is modulated by varying the number of exceptions.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we asked whether the number of exceptions
introduced would play any role in the participants’ willingness
to extend a neutral/striking property to a new instance of a novel
kind. We expected lower extension rates than in Experiment 1
due to the presence of exceptions and a sensitivity to the number
of exceptions, that is, we expected that the greater the number
of exceptions, the lower the extension rates would be. Finally, we
expected that striking properties would have a greater tolerance
of maximal exceptions than neutral ones (see section “General
Discussion” for a discussion on our predictions).
Method
Participants
A total of 32 English-speaking children (20 male; 12 female)
between 52 and 70 months of age (M = 60.29, SD = 5.13)
were recruited from two local primary schools in London,
United Kingdom. All children were English native speakers and
residents in London, United Kingdom. The sample included both
monolingual and bilingual children. For bilinguals, their parents
and teachers assessed that English was their dominant language.
A total of 152 English-speaking adults (78 male, 74 female)
between 18 and 74 years of age (M = 38.57, SD = 12.94) were
recruited via Prolific Academic, an on-line recruitment platform
for research. They were all English native speakers and residents
in the United Kingdom.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions:
neutral-minimal (8 children; 38 adults), neutral-maximal
(8 children; 38 adults), striking-minimal (8 children; 38 adults)
and striking-maximal (8 children; 38 adults).
Design
Procedures and materials. The procedure and the materials
were identical to the ones used in Experiment 1 except for
the addition of an intermediate step that involved introducing
varying numbers of exceptions (1 in the minimal, 3 in
the maximal condition). As in Experiment 1, materials were
presented to children via pre-recorded sound files acted out by
an experimenter using Sarah the puppet. The mean duration of
the whole procedure for children was 10 min 16 s (range: 7 min
50 s–13 min 30 s). Adults saw the scenarios accompanied by
written descriptions on a computer screen. The mean duration
of the whole procedure for adults was 7 min 59 s (range: 2 min
40 s–19 min 55 s). Each trial included the following three steps:
Step 1: Two instances of a novel creature were introduced
and a property was attributed using a generic nominal:
“These are glippets. Glippets love to play with toys
(neutral)/fire (striking).”
Step 2: One/Three instances of the same kind was/were
shown and identified as an exception/exceptions to the
previous assertion: “But not this one. This glippet doesn’t
love to play with toys/fire (minimal)/But not these ones.
These glippets don’t love to play with toys/fire (maximal).”
Step 3: A fourth/sixth instance of the same kind was
presented along with a question that measured extension of
the property: “Does this glippet love to play with toys/fire?”
Results and Discussion
Both adults and children extended neutral and striking properties
even in the face of exceptions. For adults in the neutral condition,
extension rates were higher in the minimal (71%) than in the
maximal condition (55%). In the striking condition, extension
rates were lower than in the neutral condition: they were at
56% for the minimal and 38% for the maximal condition. For
children in the neutral condition, extension rates were similar in
the minimal (64%) and in the maximal condition (63%). In the
striking condition, extension rates were lower than in the neutral
condition, they were at 42% for the minimal and at 19% for the
maximal condition (see Table 4 and Figure 3 below). Overall,
striking properties gave rise to fewer extensions that neutral ones.
First, we fitted the full model with property.type,
exception.type and age as fixed effects (with a three-way
interaction term) and subject and item.no as random effects.
After building the full model, we built a model without the
three-way interaction, that is, a model with all two-way
interactions. We performed a likelihood ratio test of the
full model with the three-way interaction term against the
model without the three-way interaction and the comparison
proved non-significant (χ2(1) = 1.337, p = 0.248). Including
the three-way interaction term did not significantly improve
model fit, so we used the model without the three-way
interaction term for all subsequent comparisons. We then
built subsequent models by removing one two-way interaction
at a time (property.type:exception.type, property.type:age,
exception.type:age). We performed a likelihood ratio test of
the model without the three-way interaction term against the
model without the property type:exception.type interaction
and the comparison proved non-significant (χ2(1) = 0.1747,
p = 0.676). Then, we performed a likelihood ratio test of the
model without the three-way interaction term against the model
without the property.type:age interaction and the comparison
proved non-significant (χ2(1) = 3.2976, p = 0.069). Then, we
performed a likelihood ratio test of the model without the
three-way interaction term against the model without the
exception.type:age interaction and the comparison proved
non-significant (χ2(1) = 0.1108, p = 0.739). Finally, we built
a model with the same fixed and random effects, but without
any interaction terms. We performed a likelihood ratio test
TABLE 4 | Mean percentage of property extension across conditions in
Experiment 2.
Adult Child
Experiment 2 Neutral minimal 71.18% (SE 2.65) 64.06% (SE 6.05)
Neutral maximal 54.60% (SE 2.86) 62.50% (SE 6.09)
Striking minimal 55.60% (SE 2.85) 42.18% (SE 6.22)
Striking maximal 38.16% (SE 2.79) 18.75% (SE 4.91)
Standard error in parenthesis.
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FIGURE 3 | Mean percentage of property extension across conditions in Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard error.
of the full model with the three-way interaction term against
the model without any interaction terms and the comparison
proved non-significant (χ2(4) = 4.9706, p = 0.29). Thus, adding
interaction terms did not significantly improve model fit, so we
used the model without any interaction terms for all subsequent
analyses/comparisons. The full model parameters (without any
interaction) are provided in Table 5.
We then fitted versions of this full model, from which a
single effect was removed and compared the reduced model to
the full model. In order to test the main effect of property,
we removed property.type. We performed a likelihood ratio
test of the full model against the model without property.type
and the comparison proved highly significant (χ2(1) = 25.985,
TABLE 5 | Estimates, standard errors, z values and p values of the full glmm
in Experiment 2.
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(< |z|)
Intercept
(adult, neutral, minimal) 0.04528 0.20245 0.224 0.8230
Age (child) –0.45459 0.26177 –1.737 0.0825
Property (striking) –1.02026 0.19664 –5.189 2.12e-07∗∗∗
Exception (maximal) –0.87056 0.19588 –4.444 8.82e-06∗∗∗
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ 0.001, ∗∗ 0.01, ∗ 0.05.
p < 0.001). Thus, we concluded that there was a main effect
of property in that striking properties were extended less than
neutral properties. In order to test the main effect of exception,
we removed exception.type. We performed a likelihood ratio
test of the full model against the model without exception.type
and the comparison proved highly significant (χ2(1) = 19.043,
p < 0.001). Thus, we concluded that there was a main effect of
exception in that minimal exceptions gave rise to more extensions
than maximal exceptions. In order to test the main effect of age,
we removed age. We performed a likelihood ratio test of the
model without interactions against the model without age and the
comparison did not prove significant (χ2(1) = 2.98, p = 0.084).
Thus, we concluded that there was no main effect of age.
Additional analyses were performed in order to determine
whether the percentage of property extensions was significantly
greater than chance. In order to do so, we fitted a glmer model
with only an intercept, no fixed predictors and subject and
item.no as random effects. The intercept is the overall average
property extension rate and given that there were only two
choices (“yes”/“no”), zero corresponds to 50% extension (chance
levels are at 50%), so we can see if the intercept is significantly
different from that. The intercept was not significantly different
(β = 0.19, SE = 0.19, z = 1.03, p = 0.302) from chance, thus
we concluded that the performance overall was not significantly
different from chance. Then, we fitted a glmer model without an
intercept in order to look into individual conditions (collapsed
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across the two age groups); the responses to neutral properties in
the minimal condition (β = 1.1, SE = 0.26, z = 4.3, p < 0.001)
and to striking properties in the maximal condition (β = –0.79,
SE = 0.25, z = –3.15, p = 0.002) were significantly different from
chance, while responses to neutral properties in the maximal
condition (β = 0.31, SE = 0.25, z = 1.26, p = 0.21) and
to striking properties in the minimal condition (β = 0.16,
SE = 0.25, z = 0.66, p = 0.51) were not significantly different
from chance. Finally, we fitted a glmer model without an intercept
in order to look into the different age groups; only the adults’
responses were significantly different from chance (β = 0.25,
SE = 0.12, z = 2.16, p = 0.03) and children’s responses were
not significantly different from chance (β = –0.19, SE = 0.26,
z = –0.74, p = 0.46).
Comparing extension rates between the two experiments,
we confirm that extension rates are lower in the presence of
exceptions (Experiment 2) as compared to when no exceptions
are discussed or made salient (Experiment 1) for any type of
property and in both age groups. In an additional analysis that
combined the results of both experiments in order to address the
issue of whether the presence of exceptions had any effect on the
results, we were able to determine that the presence of exceptions
significantly lowered the rate of extensions (p< 0.001).
Discussion
Experiment 2 manipulated the number of exceptions in order
to see how it would affect extension of different types of
generics (neutral/striking). First, we observe that in both groups,
extension occurs with both types of generics despite the presence
of exceptions. Given that we obtained a main effect of property,
we observe that in both groups there is a sensitivity to
strikingness. We confirm that striking properties are extended
less than neutral properties, as in Experiment 1. Second, by
comparing extension rates between the two experiments, we
confirm that extension rates are lower in the presence of
exceptions (Experiment 2) as compared to when no exceptions
are discussed or made salient (Experiment 1) for any type of
property and in both age groups. Third, given that we obtained
a main effect of exception, we observe that the number of
exceptions influences extension rates. For both types of property
in adults, the greater the number of exceptions, the lower
the rates of extension obtained. The picture was different for
children though, where the number of exceptions influenced
only striking properties. Fourth, maximal exceptions had the
same effect on both neutral and striking properties in adults,
that is, they lowered extension rates as compared to minimal
exceptions. Thus, we did not observe a higher tolerance of
maximal exceptions for striking properties. In children, maximal
exceptions lowered extension rates for striking properties, but
not for neutral properties. Finally, given that we obtained no
main effect of age, it seems that children are already exhibiting
behavior within the adult range. The overall distribution of child
responses seems to overlap with the overall distribution of adult
responses. Nevertheless, as the analyses on the difference from
chance level showed, even in the absence of a main effect of age,
the child behavior was very variable suggesting that the children’s
performance could still be chance performance.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The two experiments discussed here are the first studies to test the
strikingness of the property as a factor in forming generalizations.
The first study demonstrates that children know that generics
tolerate exceptions and that they are sensitive to the content of
the generalization presented. 4- and 5-year-olds effectively use
generic language in order to draw inferences about new instances
of a novel kind and they are adult-like in that they extend striking
properties less than neutral properties. Nevertheless, they have
not yet reached adult-like behavior.
A sensitivity to the content of the generalization was found
in both adults and children. The inferences drawn, and the
willingness to extend the property to a new exemplar of a
novel kind depended on whether the generalization concerned
something that is considered neutral in the relevant sense,
that is, something common or ordinary, or something that is
considered striking in the relevant sense, that is, something
unusual or remarkable. Related to prediction 1 above (“sensitivity
to strikingness”), we had hypothesized two possible outcomes
for the direction of this sensitivity, repeated here for ease of
reference: (a) it could be that the fact that the property is striking
and less common leads participants to be conservative and
extend striking properties less than neutral properties as would
be consistent with the Prasada et al. (2013) findings, or (b) it
could be that both children and adults would extend the property
even more in the case of striking properties than with neutral
ones in order to maximize transfer of important information
about a novel kind. This second direction seems linked to Leslie’s
theoretical account (2008) and Cimpian et al. (2010)’s empirical
findings that showed a stronger willingness to accept a generic
when it concerns a dangerous or distinctive property as opposed
to a neutral property. The observed sensitivity in our two studies
supports the first direction. That is, our results confirm that
striking properties are extended less than neutral properties by
both age groups.
There are two possible explanations for the fact that our results
are consistent with the “conservative” option. The first one is a
methodological feature and the second one is related to how we
operationalized strikingness.
The first explanation concerns methodology. Our task
involved measuring extension to a new exemplar of a novel
kind while Cimpian et al. (2010)’s task measured whether a
given statement about a novel kind was true or false. Our
task was also more immersive given the more naturalistic
environment we adopted: in our study, participants could see
and observe the novel kinds, whereas in Cimpian et al. (2010)’s
study (adult) participants only read statements about the novel
kinds. It is not clear to us at this stage how these different
designs might have contributed to the different pattern of results,
but the point we want to make here is that the tasks were
methodologically different.
The second explanation concerns the way we operationalized
strikingness. In an attempt to construct child-friendly striking
properties, strikingness was only indirect or implicit in our
study. That is, our participants had to infer the potential
danger/distinctiveness from the little information they were
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given. This does not mean though that our participants did
not understand the difference between neutral and striking
properties. Our results confirmed that even this implicit way
of operationalizing strikingness was enough to trigger different
responses by both adults and children. On the contrary, Cimpian
et al. (2010)’s items were much longer (see above) and the
danger/distinctiveness dimension was made salient through
explicit mention of “danger” and description of the potential
harm in graphic terms or detailed reference to distinctiveness (by
mentioning that no other animal has that feature). This leads us to
speculate that in order to get the effect that Cimpian et al. (2010)
obtained (that is, that the danger/distinctiveness information
increased acceptance rates for generics, especially at the lower
prevalence levels) the items should operationalize strikingness
in explicit terms.
The second study confirms the finding that both adults and
children extend striking properties less than neutral properties
and shows that in the presence of exceptions both adults and
children extend less overall. Thus, prediction 2 (“sensitivity
to exceptions”) was also borne out. The explicit mention of
exceptions made both adults and children generalize less, a
behavior that has been also observed in other studies with adults
(Lazaridou-Chatzigoga et al., 2019). Furthermore, adults are not
only sensitive to the presence of exceptions, but also to the
number. When more exceptions were present, we observed lower
extension rates with both age groups with striking properties, but
with neutral properties this was the case only with adults. That is,
children are sensitive to the number of exceptions only when the
generalization concerns a striking property. Thus, prediction 3
(“sensitivity to number of exceptions”) was only partly confirmed.
The reason why varying the amount of exceptions did not alter
children’s willingness to extend a neutral property remains to
be further investigated. It could be that for neutral properties
children need exposure to more instances of a kind to be able to
appreciate the relevance of exceptions.
It is not clear though how children integrate these two features
of a generalization together, that is, the type of property and
the amount of exceptions, as their behavior does not differ from
chance in Experiment 2. Thus, even though superficially children
seem to demonstrate the ability to accommodate varying degrees
of exceptions for striking properties while learning about new
kinds and to keep track of the amount of exceptions presented to
the generalization in question, we cannot securely attribute this
to a learned behavior in the same way that we can with adults.
We had furthermore hypothesized that striking properties
would show increased tolerance of maximal exceptions for both
age groups (prediction 4, “tolerance of maximal exceptions”).
This prediction was not borne out; indeed, we find the
opposite pattern, with less tolerance of extensions for striking
generalizations than neutral generalizations in both the minimal
and maximal conditions. Given the above discussion of the
Cimpian et al. (2010) study, it may be that in order for
“strikingness” to license generalizations in the absence of
statistical prevalence, it has to be clear that the property
constitutes a threat to others as in the case of our item “playing
with fire.” Some of our items might be dangerous or threatening
just for the creature that is involved in the activity in question,
but do not necessarily pose a threat to others e.g., “playing with
snakes.” Future research can help clarify this point.
Future Research
In future research, we aim to build on the results of the
present experiments. More work on the licensing conditions of
strikingness for adults is needed given that our results diverged
from other results in the literature. Using versions of our
materials that make explicit mention of danger/distinctiveness
only with adults in the first instance would help determine
whether the way we operationalized strikingness affected the
results. The subsequent challenge would be to prepare versions
of these explicit materials without being too alarming in order
to be able to use them to test young children. An additional
interesting dimension of strikingness is the fact that even
though the literature has focused on negative striking properties
that concern dangerous or alarming behavior, the same could
arguably hold for positive striking properties (which could
concern for instance people helping save someone else’s life
or making large donations). As Leslie (2017) notes, such cases
are not as straightforward and it is not easy to come up with
examples. It would be interesting to test, however, whether
positive striking properties would receive similar extension rates
to negative striking properties as it would help address the
question of how essential the dimension of danger or threat is
for striking properties.
Other directions for future research would be to establish
whether property extension was influenced not only by what
evidence was presented to the children, but also by how
evidence was presented, as a recent study (Lawson, 2017)
suggests that presenting evidence exemplars at the same time
(i.e., simultaneous presentation) or one by one (i.e., sequential
presentation) influenced property projections. Moreover, it
would be worthwhile to explore how our items relate to
a finding in the literature that relates to children’s and
adults’ intuitions about the balance between within-category
homogeneity and variability in induction (Brandone, 2017). For
example, individual cats may differ considerably in color but
also on other transient properties including being asleep or sick.
Brandone (2017) suggests that children begin to differentiate
their inference making based on conceptual knowledge about
the nature of the property they are asked to generalize and the
category domain by 6–8 years age. Thus, further experiments
with older children could reveal how children’s inference making
about novel kinds is influenced by such factors.
In sum, the findings underscore that 4- and 5-year-old
children are sensitive to the type of property and to exception
tolerance when they are making generalizations and are
developing toward an adult-like behavior with respect to the
interplay between strikingness and exception tolerance when they
learn about novel kinds.
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